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Efforts to address soaring medical liability insurance premiums and the
resulting patient access problems find their origins in landmark medical liability
reform legislation adopted by California over thirty years ago.' Among other
reforms, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA)
permits awards of noneconomic damages (e.g., pain and suffering) up to $250,000
in any action against a health care provider based on professional negligence. 2 This
limit has been upheld as constitutional. 3 Based on MICRA's success in stabilizing
California's medical liability climate, physicians and other healthcare providers
have called for similar limits on noneconomic damages in other states and at the
federal level. 4 Noneconomic damages are a substantial part of tort costs. 5 Statutory
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1. See Donald J. Palmisano, Health Care in Crisis: The Need for Medical Liability Reform, 5
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHIcs 371, 379 (2005) ("The AMA supports California's reforms . .. as
a model for federal and state legislation . . . ."); Richard E. Anderson, Effective Legal Reform and the
Malpractice Insurance Crisis, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICs 341, 349-50 (2005) (stating that
reforms embodied in California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act prevent a malpractice
insurance crisis from occurring).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2011).
3. See Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 695 P.2d 665, 682 (Cal. 1985); Van Buren v. Evans, No.
F054227, 2009 WL 1396235, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. May 20,2009).
4. See, e.g., Medical Liability Reform, AM. MED. ASS'N, http://www.ama-
assn.org/amalpub/advocacy/current-topics-advocacy/practice-management/medical-liability-reform.page
(advocating for MICRA-like reform at the federal level); AM. MED. ASS'N, MEDICAL LIABILITY
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upper limits such as MICRA's cap target the detrimental effects of inherently
subjective noneconomic damages on access to healthcare services.6
In addition to California, statutory limits in many states have successfully
stabilized and, in some cases, significantly reduced, medical liability insurance
rates.7 These laws have also expanded access to physicians, particularly specialists
practicing in high-risk areas and in rural communities.8 State action has
REFORM NOW! 14 (2012), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/arc/mlr-now.pdf
[hereinafter MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM NOW!] (citing to a CBO study finding financial benefits to
MICRA-like reform at the federal level and noting that several states have limited the amount of
noneconomic damages one can receive).
5. See Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289, 294 (3d Cir. 1971) (stating that "pain, suffering, and
inconvenience" is the largest single category of recovery by plaintiffs and is far greater than medical
expenses or lost wages). Scholars largely attribute the historical increase in noneconomic damages to:
(1) the availability of future pain and suffering damages; (2) the rise in automobile ownership and
personal injuries resulting from automobile accidents; (3) the greater availability of insurance and
willingness of plaintiffs' attorneys to take on lower-value cases; (4) the rise in affluence of the public
and a change in public attitude that "someone should pay"; and (5) better organization by the plaintiffs'
bar. See Philip L. Merkel, Pain and Suffering Damages at Mid-Twentieth Century: A Retrospective View
of the Problem and the Legal Academy's First Reponses, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 545, 553-54, 561, 563-65
(2006) (highlighting the various factors attributable to higher jury verdict awards for personal injury
lawsuits); see also Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of
Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 170 (2004) (discussing the growth in damages for pain and suffering).
This rise may also be due, in part, to increasing constitutional, statutory, and common law restrictions on
punitive damage awards, which have led plaintiffs' lawyers to bolster other forms of recovery. See
generally Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Tvisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards:
Turning Compensation Into "Punishment, " 54 S.C. L. REV. 47 (2002) (discussing the evolution of pain
and suffering damages and possible suggestions for reform).
6. See MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM NOW!, supra note 4, at 12-14; Fred J. Hellinger & William
E. Encinosa, The Impact of State Laws Limiting Malpractice Awards on the Geographic Distribution of
Physicians, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (July 3, 2003), available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/tortcaps/tortcaps.pdf (discussing that many doctors have been forced out
of business because of exorbitant jury awards that have increased medical malpractice premiums). One
commentator noted the difficulty expressed by jurors in putting a price on pain and suffering:
Some roughly split the difference between the defendant's and the plaintiffs
suggested figures. One juror doubled what the defendant said was fair, and another
said it should be three times medical expenses. ... A number ofjjurors assessed
pain and suffering on a per month basis. . . . Other jurors indicated that they just
came up with a figure that they thought was fair.
Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering
in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 254-55 (1993).
7. See Mark A. Behrens, Medical Liability Reform: A Case Study of Mississippi, 118 OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 335, 338 (2011) (finding a reduction in lawsuits against obstetrician-gynecologist
specialists after Mississippi enacted tort reform); see also MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM NOW!, supra
note 4, at 21-23 (finding decreases in physician liability insurance after enactment of tort reform in
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia).
8. David P. Kessler et al., Impact of Malpractice Reforms on the Supply of Physician Services, 293
JAMA 2618, 2624 (2005) (finding that tort reform has a positive effect on the supply of physicians in
three of five specialty areas); Press Release, Am. Ctr. Emergency Physicians, Tex. Med. Liability
Reforms are a Model for the Nation (Jan. 21, 2011) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law &
Policy) [hereinafter Press Release], http://www.acep.org/content.aspxid=75595 (noting an increase of
emergency care physicians in rural areas after the enactment of Texas tort reform).
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substantially improved the medical liability environment in many areas of the
country.9 The states have indeed served as laboratories for innovation.10
Many state courts have upheld noneconomic damage limits applicable to
health care liability claims." For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals recently upheld that state's limit on noneconomic damages in medical
liability cases, stating "[w]e note that our decision today is consistent with the
majority of jurisdictions that have considered the constitutionality of caps on
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions or in any personal injury
action."l 2 Several state courts have upheld laws that go further and limit total
recoveries in medical liability cases.' 3 Other courts have upheld the
9. See, e.g., Behrens, supra note 7, at 336-38 (outlining the decrease in lawsuits against
physicians as a result of Mississippi tort reform); Ronald M. Stewart et al., Malpractice Risk and Cost
are Significantly Reduced After Tort Reform, 212 J. AM. COLL. SURGEONS 463, 465-66 (2011) (finding
that tort reform in Texas resulted in a significant decrease in the prevalence and cost of surgical
malpractice lawsuits at one academic medical center).
10. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratory of Democracy, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1501, 1512 (2009) (explaining that states have engaged in "tort experiments" as a
response to the increased costs associated with medical liability).
11. See Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985) ($250,000 limit on noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice actions did not violate equal protection or due process); Stinnett v.
Tam, 130 Cal. Ct. App. 732 (2011) (noneconomic damages limit did not violate equal protection or right
to jury trial); Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993) (finding cap on noneconomic
damages constitutional); HCA Health Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Branchesi, 620 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1993)
(statute did not violate access to courts); Parham v. Florida Health Sciences Ctr., Inc., 35 So. 3d 920
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (cap did not violate right to jury trial); Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d
721 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (cap limiting noneconomic loss recoveries in medical malpractice actions did
not violate the right to jury trial, separation of powers, or equal protection and did not infringe on the
Court's rulemaking authority); Adams ex rel. Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo.
1992) (medical liability limit on noneconomic damages did not violate equal protection, open courts,
right to remedy, due process, or right to jury trial); Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990)
(Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act's limit on wrongful death damages did not violate
open courts, right to redress, or equal protection); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135 (Utah 2004) (medical
malpractice noneconomic damages cap did not violate open courts, uniform operation of laws, due
process, right to jury trial, or separation of powers); MacDonald v. City Hosp., Inc., 715 S.E.2d 405 (W.
Va. 2011) (upholding cap on noneconomic damages); In re Estate of Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d
406 (W. Va. 2001) (upholding cap on noneconomic damages); Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr.,
414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991) (finding cap on noneconomic damages constitutional); see also Carly N.
Kelly & Michelle M. Mello, Are Medical Malpractice Damages Caps Constitutional? An Overview of
State Litigation, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 515, 527 (2005) ("Over the years, the scales in state courts have
increasingly tipped toward upholding noneconomic damages caps.").
12. MacDonald, 715 S.E.2d at 421.
13. See Garhart ex rel. Tinsman v. Columbia/Healthone, L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571 (Colo. 2004)
(upholding aggregate limit on damages recoverable in health care liability actions); Scholz v. Metro.
Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993) (finding statute did not violate due process or equal
protection); Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43 (Neb. 2003)
(upholding aggregate limit on damages in medical liability actions); Pulliam v. Coastal Emer. Servs. of
Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307 (Va. 1999) (holding aggregate limit on medical malpractice recoveries
constitutional) (affirming Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989)); Johnson v. St.
Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980) (upholding aggregate limit on health care liability
damages and other medical liability reforms), overruled on other grounds, In re Stephens, 867 N.E.2d
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constitutionality of limits on noneconomic damages that apply to all personal injury
actions' 4 or in other contexts.1i In some states, however, restrictions in state
constitutions that have no federal corollary (e.g., "open courts" or "right to a
remedy" provisions) and the placement of politics over the public interest have
prevented enactment of reforms.16 Federal legislation would provide a
comprehensive, national solution. 7
Most federal medical liability reform legislation looks to successful state
reforms, such as California's MICRA, as a model for improving the healthcare
environment for all Americans.'5 Such legislation would fill in the gaps left by
states that have not been able to adopt their own reforms.19
148 (Ind. 2007) (holding attorneys could employ a sliding scale fee arrangement when representing
medical malpractice clients under Patient Compensation Fund); Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp., 607
So. 2d 517 (La. 1992) (upholding $500,000 limit on general damages in medical malpractice actions,
exclusive of the cost of future medical care and related benefits).
14. See L.D.G., Inc. v. Brown, 211 P.3d 1110 (Alaska 2009) (holding that noneconomic damages
cap did not violate right to jury trial); C.J. v. Dep't of Corr., 151 P.3d 373 (Alaska 2006) (holding cap
did not violate equal protection); Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002) (upholding
noneconomic damages cap and other tort reforms); In re Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d
1115 (Idaho 2000) (holding that cap on noneconomic damages did not violate constitutional
protections); DRD Pool Serv., Inc. v. Freed, 5 A.3d 45 (Md. 2010) (holding limit on noneconomic
damages constitutional); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102 (Md. 1992) (upholding statutory cap on
noneconomic damages in personal injury actions); Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio
2007) (upholding statutory limit on noneconomic damages with a lower limit for small employers).
15. See Samples v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological, 40 So. 3d 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
(upholding cap on claims by parents by birth-related neurological injuries); King v. Va. Birth-Related
Neurological Injury Comp. Program, 410 S.E.2d 656 (Va. 1991) (holding that law removing claims of
neurologically injured infants from the tort system was constitutional); Wessels v. Garden Way, Inc.,
689 N.W.2d 526 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding cap on noneconomic loss recoveries in product
liability actions); Mizrahi v. North Miami Med. Ctr., Ltd., 761 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2000) (holding
provision in wrongful death statute precluding adult children from recovering nonpecuniary damages in
an action for a parent's death due to medical malpractice did not violate equal protection); Adams v. Via
Christi Reg'I Med. Ctr., 19 P.3d 132 (Kan. 2001) (upholding limit on noneconomic damages for
wrongful death); Peters v. Saft, 597 A.2d 50 (Me. 1991) (upholding limit on nonmedical damages
recoverable against servers of liquor); Schweich v. Ziegler, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1990)
(upholding limit on damages for embarrassment, emotional distress, and loss of consortium); Lawson v.
Hoke, 119 P.3d 210 (Or. 2005) (upholding statute precluding award of noneconomic damages to
uninsured motorists in actions arising from automobile accidents).
I 6. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Fostering Mutual Respect and Cooperation Between State Courts
and State Legislatures: A Sound Alternative to a Tort Tug of War, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 5-6, 1 1-12
(2000) (discussing how state legislatures are best suited to "weigh and balance" broad tort policy issues).
17. See infra Part II.
18. Cf CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES 1
(2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5549/Report.pdf (evaluating the success of
tort reforms at the state level to determine whether similar reforms would work federally).
19. See, e.g., Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2011,
H.R. 5, 112th Cong. (2011) (as reported in the House of Representatives). The core of H.R. 5 is a
$250,000 limit on noneconomic damages in healthcare liability actions, following the MICRA model.
Id. § 4(b). Other reforms in H.R. 5 include: (1) a statute of limitations of three years after the date of
manifestation of injury or one year after the claimant discovers the injury, with certain exceptions; (2)
fair share liability reform to provide that each party is liable based on its percentage of responsibility; (3)
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This essay establishes that MICRA-like federal medical liability reform
legislation is constitutional, 20 consistent with federalism principles, 21 and represents
sound public policy. 22 The analysis is based on existing United States Supreme
Court precedent and does not propose new legal theories to expand the application
of the United States Constitution's Commerce Clause. 23
I. FEDERAL MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM LEGISLATION IS CONSTITUTIONAL
Federal medical liability reform legislation is consistent with Congress's
authority to regulate interstate commerce given the cross-border impact of medical
liability on doctors and patients, and considering the federal government's
significant role in the healthcare system. 24 Congress's authority to adopt such
legislation is clear. 25
A. The Commerce Clause
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution provides
Congress with authority "to regulate commerce ... among the several states."26
This enumerated power is the source of Congress's authority to enact medical
liability reform legislation. 27 The United States Supreme Court "has made clear that
the commerce power extends not only to 'the use of channels of interstate or
foreign commerce' and to 'protection of the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce,' but also to 'activities affecting commerce."' 28 In determining whether
sliding scale limits on attorney contingency fees depending on the amount of damages; (4) permitting
the jury to consider compensation the plaintiff received from collateral sources; (5) reserving punitive
damages to the most reprehensible conduct by requiring clear and convincing evidence that a healthcare
provider acted with malicious intent to injure the claimant or deliberately failed to avoid unnecessary
injury the claimant was substantially certain to suffer; (6) limiting punitive damages to the greater of two
times the amount of economic damages awarded or $250,000; (7) a compliance with standards defense
to punitive damages for manufacturers and distributors of FDA-approved medical products; and (8)
authorizing periodic payments of future damages. Id. §§ 3, 4(d), 5(a), 6, 7(a)-(c), 8(a).
20. See infra Part 1.
21. See infra Parts LB, E, F.
22. See infra Part IC, E.
23. See infra Part L.A.
24. See HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY REFORM:
LEGAL ISSUES AND FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF CAPS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND NONECONOMIC
DAMAGES 2 (2005), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL31692_20050208.pdf (noting that
Congress has power to regulate medical malpractice under the Commerce Clause).
25. See infra Part I (outlining constitutional principles upon which Congress has the power and
authority to adopt federal medical liability legislation).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
27. HENRY COHEN & VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL TORT REFORM
LEGISLATION: CONSTITUTIONALITY AND SUMMARIES OF SELECTED STATUTES 2-3 (2008) (stating that
tort reform legislation would generally be within Congress's commerce power).
28. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981) (quoting
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971)).
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Congress has acted within its authority under the Commerce Clause, a court will
look to whether the activity is economic in nature, whether there are discernable
ties to commerce, whether the activity as a whole has an effect on commerce, and
what congressional findings have been made with respect to the activity's effects
on commerce. 29 A federal statute will survive a Commerce Clause challenge if the
law regulates activities that, when "viewed in the aggregate," substantially affect
interstate commerce. 30
Since the 1942 case of Wickard v. Filburn,31 involving Congress's power to
regulate the production of homegrown wheat, the United States Supreme Court has
interpreted the Commerce Clause quite broadly with respect to the regulation of
economic activity. 32 In Wickard, the Court found that "even if appellee's activity be
local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce . 3.. ."3 The Court rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to
the statute, concluding that wheat farming as a whole substantially affects interstate
commerce. 34 The Court later reaffirmed that "even activity that is purely intrastate
in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like
conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with
foreign nations." 35
More recently, the Supreme Court has placed appropriate restrictions on how
far Congress may go in using the Commerce Clause to justify federal action, 36 but
the application of this law to federal medical liability reform legislation is not a
close call.37 For example, in United States v. Lopez,35 the Court invalidated the Gun
29. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562, 558-59 (1995) (describing the factors used by
the Court to decide whether Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate an activity).
30. Id. at 561.
31. 317 U.S. 11 (1942).
32. Id. at 114-17, 128-33; see, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (holding federal criminal law
prohibiting possession of a firearm in a local school zone unconstitutional because the law did not
regulate an economic activity and thus had no affect on interstate commerce).
33. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
34. Id. at 128-29.
35. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981)
(quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975)). Libertarian legal scholar Randy Barnett, an
opponent of medical liability reform at the federal level, has nevertheless acknowledged that the
Substantial Effects Doctrine "is followed even by conservative justices." Randy E. Barnett, Op-Ed.,
Tort Reform and the GOP s Fair-Weather Federalism, WASH. EXAMINER, May 21, 2011,
http://washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/2011/05/tort-reform-and-gops-fair-weather-federalism.
36. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-60 (1995) (outlining three broad categories of
activity that Congress may regulate, including the use of the channels of interstate commerce, the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce).
37. Id. at 567-68 (overturning a federal criminal law prohibiting possession of a firearm in a local
school zone).
38. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Free School Zones Act of 1990, which provided a federal criminal penalty for
possession of a firearm in a local school zone.39 Similarly, in Morrison v. United
States,40 the Court overturned the Violence Against Women Act for its reliance on
the Commerce Clause in making domestic violence against women a federal
crime.41 These cases simply caution Congress that the Court will not allow the
Commerce Clause to be stretched to the point of supporting "criminal statute[s] that
by [their] terms ha[ve] nothing to do with 'commerce' of any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms." 42
Congress continues to have broad authority to regulate economic activity. 4 3
For example, while the Supreme Court struck down the criminal penalty for
possession of a firearm in a school zone, courts have uniformly upheld the
constitutionality of a recent federal law that protects federally licensed
manufacturers and sellers of firearms from most civil liability for injuries
independently and intentionally inflicted by criminals who use their non-defective
products (i.e., the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act).44
Medical injury litigation, in particular, is easily distinguished from Lopez and
Morrison because "(1) the activity in question ... is itself commercial activity and
(2) the effects of medical malpractice litigation on the national economy are
substantial." 45 As scholars have explained:
Medical malpractice litigation is big business. The direct costs of
medical malpractice litigation have been estimated at $28 billion a
year, but the economic effects are far larger and resonate throughout
the economy in terms of ever-increasing costs for medical care.
Moreover, many medical malpractice lawyers, experts, and medical
malpractice insurance carriers do business in multiple states and
thus are engaged directly in interstate commerce. 46
39. Id. at 551.
40. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
41. Id. at 627. See also United States v. Wilkinson, 626 F. Supp. 2d 184, 194-95 (D. Mass. 2009)
(holding that Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper
Clause by enacting a statute authorizing civil commitment of a sexually dangerous person).
42. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
43. See, e.g., In re Estate of Charlot v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d 174, 182
(D.D.C. 2009) (noting that acts of Congress have a "strong presumption of validity" and courts will
uphold laws that have an economic purpose unless it is demonstrated that the laws are irrational or
arbitrary).
44. See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3320
(2010) (dismissing claims brought by shooting victims against federally licensed manufacturers and
sellers of firearms and holding the shield from liability under the PLCAA valid); City of New York v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 395 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding Congress did not exceed its Commerce
Clause authority in enacting the PLCAA); In re Estate of Chariot, 628 F. Supp. 2d at 185-86
(concurring "with the rationale of the other courts that have examined the PLCAA").
45. E. Donald Elliott et al., Administrative "Health Courts" for Medical Injury Claims: The
Federal Constitutional Issues, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 761, 771 (2008).
46. Id. at 767 (citation omitted).
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The nonpartisan Congressional Research Service (CRS) has closely analyzed
judicial precedent and concluded "there seems little doubt that tort reform
legislation, in general, would be within Congress's commerce power."47 Under its
power to regulate interstate commerce, Congress may "make such legislation
applicable to intrastate torts, because tort suits generally affect interstate
commerce." 48 The only arguable exception, CRS recognized, is when a federal tort
reform applies to a particular intrastate tort, such as an assault by one individual
resident on another, that has no connection with any commercial activity.49 CRS
concluded that "[t]here would appear to be no due process or federalism (or any
other constitutional) impediments to Congress's limiting a state common law right
of recovery."50 With respect to MICRA-like federal legislation, CRS has
specifically recognized that "[m]edical malpractice liability is governed by state
law, but Congress has the power, under the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl. 3) to regulate it."5'
Healthcare is truly national in scope and fundamental to interstate
commerce. 52 Congress promotes access to healthcare by making health insurance a
tax-free benefit for employees and their families.53 In addition, the Medicare and
Medicaid programs are the financing system for tens of millions of Americans. 54
The FY 2011 federal budget recognized that "[tihe key drivers of the long-range
deficit are the Government's major health and retirement programs: Medicare,
Medicaid and Social Security."55 Based on the federal expenditures for these and
other programs, and the interstate nature of the medical liability insurance market,
Congress has authority to "regulate" the field of medical liability. 56 By placing an
47. COHEN & BURROWS, supra note 27, at 2.
48. Id. at 18.
49. Id. at 2.
50. Id. at 18.
51. COHEN, supra note 24, at 1.
52. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in Medical
Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 847-48 (2009) (noting that state medical malpractice
spillover costs are covered by the federal government).
53. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 236-37 (2010) [hereinafter 2011 BUDGET OF THE U.S.] (outlining
tax consequences to employers and individuals of health insurance and expenses). Tax-free health
insurance is estimated to cost the federal government more than $1 trillion in foregone revenue between
2011 and 2015. Id. at 211 tbl.16-1.
54. Id. at 45 (explaining the growth of the Medicare and Medicaid programs and the coverage these
programs provide to America's disabled and elderly).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Federalism: Whatever Happened to Devolution?,
14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 429, 443 (1996) (noting that under the spending power, federal funding for
Medicare and Medicaid could provide a rationale for federal regulation of medical malpractice laws);
Paul Taylor, The Federalist Papers, the Commerce Clause, and Federal Tort Reform, 45 SUFFOLK U. L.
L. REV. 357, 357 (2012) (stating, "In the modem era, Congress has enacted many federal 'tort reform'
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upper limit on subjective and otherwise limitless pain and suffering damages
against doctors and other medical professionals, Congress can promote a more
cost-effective healthcare delivery system.
B. The Tenth Amendment
Federal medical liability reform legislation is consistent with the Tenth
Amendment, which provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."57 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted
the Tenth Amendment to prohibit Congress from "compe[lling] the States to
implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs."58 In
1992, in New York v. United States,59 the Court invoked the Tenth Amendment to
invalidate a federal statute that required states to enact legislation to provide for the
disposal of radioactive waste or "take title" to the waste.60 The Court ruled that
Congress may not "command a state government to enact state regulation" even if
the federal government might regulate the area directly-it may not "conscript state
governments as its agents." 6' Five years later, in Printz v. United States,62 the Court
applied similar reasoning to invalidate the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act.63 The Brady Act required chief law enforcement officers of the states to
conduct a background check of individuals applying for handgun permits." Printz
spoke on the "compelled enlistment of state executive officers for the
administration of federal programs," which the Court referred to as "executive-
commandeering." 65 The Court ruled that Congress violates the Tenth Amendment
when "the whole object of the law [is] to direct the functioning of the state
executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual
sovereignty." 66
statutes that supersede contrary state laws, and judicial precedents leave little doubt as to their
constitutionality.").
57. U.S. CONsT. amend. X. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Federalism and Federal Liability
Reform: The United States Constitution Supports Reform, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 269, 304 (1999)
(noting that legislation enacted under Congress's enumerated powers is constitutional).
58. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (emphasis added).
59. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
60. Id. at 175-76.
61. Id. at 178.
62. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot require States to enforce a federal
regulatory program).
63. Id. at 933 ("The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program.") (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)).
64. Id. at 902-03.
65. Id. at 905, 916.
66. Id. at 932 (emphasis added).
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In contrast, federal medical liability reform legislation does not require states
to enact legislation, nor does it compel state executive branch action. 67 The
legislation simply provides legal rules to be applied in medical liability actions. 68
Presently, federal courts sitting in diversity and state courts routinely engage in a
choice-of-law analysis to determine which law to apply in a particular tort case. 69
For example, under current law, a federal or state court in California may choose to
apply Oklahoma law if Oklahoma has a greater nexus to the case. 70 After
enactment, federal medical liability reforms would be factored into the same type
of calculus, with courts applying the federal law to the extent it provides a rule and
the applicable state law to all other aspects of the case. It is also worth noting that
because of the familiarity of courts with choice-of-law analyses,7 1 and the courts'
frequent application of state laws that are similar (if not identical) to MICRA-like
federal reforms, 72 the legislation would not result in confusion when applied by
courts after enactment.
67. Cf Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 142 (2000) (finding that Congress, in enacting the Drivers'
Privacy Protection Act, had an adequate grounding in interstate commerce and properly regulated the
sale or release of drivers' personal information because even while placing some obligations on state
agencies, "[iut does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations ... and it
does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private
individuals").
68. See, e.g., Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2011,
H.R. 5, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (purporting to improve access to health care services and enhance medical
care by decreasing the unnecessary burden of liability on healthcare providers).
69. See, e.g., McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 225 P.3d 516, 524 (Cal. 2010) (explaining
California's approach to choice of law rules).
70. See id. at 527, 534 (noting that once a court determines there is a conflict of law between two
states, the court will apply the law of the state whose interest would be more damaged if that state's law
is not used).
71. See id. at 524 (explaining the choice of law rule that California "adopted and consistently
applied" over the past forty years).
72. See, e.g., id. at 530, 536 (discussing suits brought by California plaintiffs against out-of-state
defendants seeking to apply California law when the claim arose in a state that restricts awards for
economic damages).
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C. The Guarantees ofDue Process and Equal Protection
The Fifth Amendment provides that a person shall not be "deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."73 Constitutional principles also
prohibit the government from denying to any person the equal protection of the
laws. 74 In cases involving constitutional challenges to economic regulation, such as
liability limits, courts traditionally apply a deferential test that requires only that the
law have a rational relationship to a legitimate government objective.75 Federal
medical liability reform legislation is rationally related to addressing healthcare
costs and the practice of "defensive medicine," while ensuring that people with
meritorious claims receive adequate compensation.76
Tort reform legislation unavoidably involves a certain element of line-
drawing. Consequently, plaintiffs' lawyers have claimed that it is unconstitutional
for a law to treat individuals in medical liability claims differently than those with
other personal injuries77 or impose a limit that will have a greater impact on those
with more serious injuries than those with lesser injuries.78 The United States
Supreme Court, however, has firmly rejected such arguments in other tort liability
contexts. 79 In addition, federal appellate courts have upheld noneconomic damages
limits as "classic example[s]" of economic regulation-"a legislative effort to
structure and accommodate 'the burdens and benefits of economic life."' 80 As the
Tenth Circuit explained, "[w]hen a legislature strikes a balance between a tort
victim's right to recover noneconomic damages and society's interest in preserving
the availability of affordable liability insurance, it is engaging in its fundamental
and legitimate role of structur[ing] and accommodat[ing] 'the burdens and benefits
of economic life."' 8
73. U.S. CONsT. amend V.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform
Due Process and Equal Protection Analysis, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 3, 29 (1983) (outlining the "suggestion
that equal protection guarantees were part of the Constitution" before the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
75. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (explaining the "rational
basis" standard in the assessment of constitutionality).
76. See Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1437 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that a California
statute providing for a cap on noneconomic damages satisfied the rational basis standard and therefore
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
77. Knowles v. United States, 829 F. Supp. 1147, 1153 & n.5 (D.S.D. 1993).
78. Id.
79. See Schwartz et al., supra note 57, at 280-97 (describing cases in which the Supreme Court has
upheld legislation regulating specific tort classifications as constitutional).
80. See, e.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978)). In Boyd, the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia's
statutory limit on medical liability awards had a reasonable relation to a valid legislative purpose and did
not violate due process or equal protection. Id. at 1197.
81. Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235, 1247 (10th Cir.) (quoting Boyd, 877 F.2d at 1196).
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D. Right to Jury Trial
The Seventh Amendment states that "[i]n suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved." 82 Federal appellate courts recognize that the jury's role "as factfinder
[is] to determine the extent of a plaintiffs injuries," not "to determine the legal
consequences of its factual findings."83 Furthermore, a judge who "merely
implement[s] a policy decision of the legislature in applying the law enacted by the
legislature when it predetermined the extent and amount of damages that it, the
legislature, would allow in a malpractice action" does not "reexamin[e] a 'fact tried
by a jury'" within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment. 84 State high courts have
also found that statutory limits on noneconomic damages do not intrude on the role
of the jury. 5
When opponents of limits on noneconomic damages have challenged state
statutes, they have sometimes pointed to case law holding that a judge may not
unilaterally reduce a jury's verdict.86 These cases recognize that a judge who finds
that a verdict is excessive or otherwise not supported by the evidence must offer the
plaintiff a choice-accept the lower verdict or face a new trial, a process known as
"remittitur."87 Statutory limits on noneconomic damages, however, reflect a public
policy choice by the legislature, not a legal decision by ajudge.8
82. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
83. Boyd, 877 F.2d at 1196.
84. Davis v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155, 1162 (3d Cir. 1989).
85. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp. 695 P.2d 665, 680 (Cal. 1985) (noting the "broad
control" that the Legislature has over the assessment of damages); Peters v. Saft, 597 A.2d 50, 53-54
(Me. 1991) (emphasizing a jury's right to determine damages) (citation omitted); DRD Pool Servs., Inc.
v. Freed, 5 A.3d 45, 57 (Md. 2010) (noting that a cap on damages is independent from the right to a jury
trial.); Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 907 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (upholding a
statutory limit on noneconomic damages following the jury's determination of facts and assessment of
damages); Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420, 431 (Ohio 2007) (explaining that awards can
be properly modified "[s]o long as the fact-finding process is not intruded upon"); Pulliam v. Coastal
Emergency Servs., 509 S.E.2d 307, 312 (Va. 1999) ("The medical malpractice cap, we said, does
nothing more than establish the outer limits of a remedy; remedy is a matter of law and not of fact; and a
trial court applies the remedy's limitation only after the jury has fulfilled its fact-finding function.")
(citing Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 529 (Va. 1989)).
86. See Hetzel v. Prince William Cnty., Va., 523 U.S. 208, 211 (1998) (holding that a court lacks
authority to modify a damage award entered by a jury).
87. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 409 (9th ed. 2009) (defining remittitur as "[a]n order awarding
a new trial, or a damages amount lower than that awarded by the jury, and requiring the plaintiff to
choose between those alternatives"). Federal courts have used remittitur for nearly 200 years. See Blunt
v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760, 761-62 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1,578) (determining that the court may grant a
new trial for excessive damages and that it is the duty of the court to interfere in order to prevent a
wrong, if the jury award reflects gross error). Despite its firm establishment in federal law and practice,
much deference is given to juries that "had the opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses at
trial." Tezak v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 33 F. App'x 172, 178 (6th Cir. 2002). Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1935), involved whether a judge may increase a jury's verdict, rather
than reduce it, which is a distinction the Supreme Court recognized as significant because no jury would
have passed on the increased amount. Furthermore, the Dinick decision "was directed at the power of
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In addition, opponents of limits on civil tort damages have argued that a
decision involving federal copyright law, Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television,
Inc.,89 supports their view.90 It does not. Feltner found only that the plaintiff had a
right for a jury to determine the amount of his or her statutory damages, not that a
plaintiff had a right to have a jury exceed the limits set by Congress on such
damages.9' Any question that Feltner prohibits such limits is discredited by the fact
that the Copyright Act itself authorizes damages either "in a sum of not less than
$500 or more than $20,000," or "a sum of not more than $100,000," depending on
the circumstances. 92
E. Courts Routinely Uphold Federal Civil Justice Reform Laws
For over a century, courts have consistently upheld federal tort reform laws as
constitutional. 93 Early laws regulated liability for personal injury and property
damage on railroads and ships. 94 In the 1970s and 1980s, courts upheld federal laws
addressing liability stemming from a wide range of issues, including black lung
disease,95 nuclear power,96 swine flu 97 and childhood vaccinations,98 and atomic
weapons testing,99 among others. Since that time, the judiciary has upheld federal
judges, not of the legislature and, by virtue of the very context of the decision, related to modification of
a jury verdict by a judge, not an enactment of a statute." Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp.
1325, 1331 (D. Md. 1989).
88. See Davis, 883 F.2d at 1161 (holding that it is the role of the legislature, not the jury, to
"determine the legal consequences of its factual findings").
89. 523 U.S. 340 (1998).
90. Id. at 355.
91. Id.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l)-(2) (2006).
93. Schwartz et al., supra note 57, at 280.
94. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 37-39 (1932) (upholding the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act); Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 49-50
(1912) (upholding the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908); Providence v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S.
578, 588 (1883) (upholding the Limitation of Vessel Shipowners' Liability Act and the Harter Act).
95. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1976) (upholding the Black Lung
Benefits Act of 1972).
96. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 86-88 (1978) (upholding
the Price-Anderson Act).
97. See DiPippa v. United States, 687 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1982) (upholding the Swine Flu Act on
rational basis grounds); Ducharme v. Merrill-Nat'l Labs., Inc., 574 F.2d 1307, 1311 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1002 (1978) (upholding the Swine Flu Act as a "valid exercise of Congressional
power under the Constitution"); Wolfe v. Merrill-Nat'l Labs., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 231, 238 (M.D. Tenn.
1977); Jones v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 583 F.2d 1070,1070 (8th Cir. 1978); Sparks v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 431
F. Supp. 411, 418 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (upholding the Swine Flu Act as Constitutional on Seventh
Amendment grounds).
98. See Black v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 93 F.3d 781, 787 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (upholding
the eligibility requirement for participation in federal no-fault compensation program for injuries arising
out of vaccine administration).
99. See Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1986) (upholding a statute relieving
government contractors operating nuclear weapons testing from tort liability); see also In re Consol.
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laws limiting the liability of general aviation aircraft manufacturers, 100 rental car
companies,' 0' and firearms manufacturers. 0 2 Federal securities litigation reform
legislation has also been upheld as constitutional. 03 In recent years, Congress has
promoted various socially desirable activities by providing liability relief for school
teachers,0 4 volunteers,105 suppliers of materials used in implantable medical
devices,106 donors of grocery products to nonprofit organizations, 07 good
Samaritans who use automated external defibrillators (AEDs) to help people in
medical emergencies, 0 and Amtrak. 0 9 As the United States Supreme Court has
recognized:
Our cases have clearly established that "[a] person has no property,
no vested interest, in any rule of the common law." The
"Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the
abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a
permissible legislative object," despite the fact that "otherwise
settled expectations" may be upset thereby. Indeed, statutes
U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982, 991-92 (9th Cir. 1987) (limiting the tort liability for
government contractors for radiation exposure).
100. See, e.g., Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding Congressional
authority to bar action under the General Aviation Revitalization Act [GARA] of 1994); Robinson v.
Hartzell Propeller Inc., 454 F.3d 163, 174 (3d Cir. 2006) (upholding the constitutionality of GARA).
101. For a review of cases upholding the Graves Amendment, which governs liability against rental
car companies, see, e.g., Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242, 1253 (11th Cir.
2008); Carton v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 639 F. Supp. 2d 982, 992 (N.D. Iowa 2009); Green v.
Toyota Motor Creditcorp, 605 F. Supp. 2d 430, 434-35 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Flagler v. Budget Rent A Car
Sys., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 2d 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Stampolis v. Provident Auto Leasing Co., 586 F. Supp.
2d 88, 92-94, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Jasman v. DTG Operations, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 753, 756 (W.D.
Mich. 2008); Berkan v. Penske Truck Leasing Can., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 341, 345 (W.D.N.Y. 2008);
Rodriguez v. Testa, 993 A.2d 955, 969 (Conn. 2010).
102. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
103. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 326-27 (2007) (holding that
heightened pleading standards prescribed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act did not violate
the Seventh Amendment).
104. See Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Protection Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6731-6738 (2006)
(excepting teachers from liability when acting within the scope of their employment).
105. See Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501-14505 (2006) (restricting the
liability of a volunteer at a nonprofit entity for the actions of that volunteer acting on behalf of the
nonprofit or governmental entity).
106. See Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1606 (2006) (providing
options for biomaterials suppliers to limit their liability).
107. See Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1791 (2006)
(preventing liability of an individual who donates apparently good food to a nonprofit organization and
to a nonprofit organization that received an apparently good food donation).
108. See Cardiac Arrest Survival Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 238q (2006) (providing immunity for an
individual who attempts to help someone in cardiac arrest with an automated external defibulator
device).
109. See Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997, 49 U.S.C. § 28103 (2006) (limiting the
liability of passenger railways by requiring a plaintiff to show, by "clear and convincing evidence," that
the railroad conducted itself with "a conscious, flagrant indifference to the ights or safety of others").
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limiting liability are relatively commonplace and have consistently
been enforced by the courts. 0
F. Time After Time, Courts Reject Federal Constitutional Challenges to State
Medical Liability Reform Laws
Decisions upholding state medical liability reforms under the United States
Constitution also support the constitutionality of MICRA-like federal medical
liability reform legislation."' Numerous federal courts have rejected challenges to
state noneconomic damages limits under the United States Constitution as
meritless.11 2 Even personal injury lawyers have long understood that the United
States Constitution does not bar civil liability reform." 3 That is why a leading
lawyer who represents the interests of personal injury lawyers has bluntly
110. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32 (1978) (citations
omitted).
111. See Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 695 P.2d 665, 682 (Cal. 1985) (upholding the
constitutionality of MICRA and finding it within state legislature's authority). Similarly, a federal
statute can be justified under the need of furthering a legitimate state interest, such as limiting the costs
of medical malpractice insurance. Id. at 686. In addition to justifying the legitimate federal interest in
medical liability reform, Congress also has such authority under the Commerce Clause. See COHEN,
supra note 24, at 1.
112. See, e.g., In re Estate of McCall v. United States, 642 F.3d 944, 951 (1lth Cir. 2011) (finding
Florida's limit on noneconomic damages in medical liability actions does not violate the U.S.
Constitution); Smith v. Botsford Gen. Hosp., 419 F.3d 513, 519-20 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding Michigan's
limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions does not violate the Seventh
Amendment); Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235, 1247 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding Kansas's
limit on noneconomic losses in health care liability actions); Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1197 (4th
Cir. 1989) (finding Virginia's limit on recovery in medical malpractice actions does not violate the U.S.
Constitution); Davis v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155, 1165 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding the Virgin Islands'
limit on noneconomic damages does not violate the Seventh Amendment); Hoffman v. United States,
767 F.2d 1431, 1437 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding California's limit on noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice suits does not violate the U.S. Constitution); In re Estate of Sisk v. Manzanares, 270 F.
Supp. 2d 1265, 1278-79 (D. Kan. 2003) (upholding Kansas's noneconomic damage cap in wrongful
death actions under the U.S. Constitution); Watson v. Hortman, No. 2:08-CV-81-TJW-CE, 2010 WL
3566736, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2010) (rejecting a challenge to Texas's limit on noneconomic
damages in health care liability claims under the U.S. and Texas Constitutions); Simms v. Holiday Inns,
Inc., 746 F. Supp. 596, 598 (D. Md. 1990) (upholding Maryland's limit on noneconomic damages in
personal injury actions); Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1335 (D. Md. 1989)
(finding Maryland's noneconomic damage limit does not violate the U.S. or Maryland Constitutions);
Fed. Express Corp. v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1271 (D. N.M. 2002) (finding New
Mexico's medical liability limit is not arbitrary and capricious). See also Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 429 n.9 (1996) (recognizing that courts of appeals regularly find that
district court application of statutory caps on medical malpractice jury verdicts does not violate the
Seventh Amendment); Owen v. United States, 935 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding medical
malpractice liability limit valid under Louisiana's Constitution).
113. See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Judicial Nullification of Civil Justice Reform Violates
the Fundamental Federal Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers: How to Restore the Right
Balance, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 917-19 (2001) (concluding that federal tort reform is likely to be
Constitutional).
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counseled plaintiffs' lawyers that "most state constitutions are far superior to the
federal constitution" for nullifying tort reform laws. 14
11. FEDERAL MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM LEGISLATION RETAINS STATE
AUTHORITY AND PROVIDES SIGNIFICANT FLEXIBILITY FOR STATE-BASED
SOLUTIONS
Federal medical liability reform legislation presently under consideration
would preserve existing state medical liability laws, regardless of whether a state
has enacted a limit on noneconomic damages that is higher or lower than the
proposed federal limit of $250,000.'15 Thus, the legislation would not impact states
such as Mississippi, which has enacted a $500,000 limit on noneconomic damages
in medical liability cases," 6 or Maryland, where the noneconomic damage cap
applicable to medical liability claims currently stands at $710,000 and increases
$15,000 each year.' 7 Nor would the federal legislation impact laws in states such
as Indiana, Nebraska, or Virginia, which have chosen to place aggregate limits on
compensatory damages in medical liability lawsuits. Is
Under the currently proposed federal legislation, states would also have the
flexibility to adopt their own limits on damages in healthcare lawsuits after the
federal legislation is enacted.119 States would continue to have a wide range of
options for addressing medical liability.120 For instance, with respect to
noneconomic damages, states could set a higher limit in all cases or in cases
involving catastrophic injury,'21 opt to include an annual inflation adjustment,12 2 or
114. Id. at 917 (quoting Ned Miltenberg, Constitutional Challenges to Tort Reform, Learn How to
Develop Substantive and Procedural Challenges to Tort Reform Legislation, Address Before the Annual
Meeting Session of Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of Am. (1999)).
115. See Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2011, H.R. 5,
112th Cong. § Il(c) (2011) (as reported in the House of Representatives) (stating that the proposed
federal limit on noneconomic damages preempts state law where there is no state cap on noneconomic
damages).
116. Miss. CODE ANN. § I 1-1-60(2)(a) (Supp. 2011).
117. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09 (LexisNexis 2006).
118. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-14-3 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2009) (limiting the total amount
recoverable in medical malpractice cases to $1.25 million and to $250,000 per health care provider with
any amount in excess of these limits is to be paid from a Patient's Compensation Fund); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 44-2825 (2010) (limiting total damages in medical malpractice cases to $1.75 million and
the liability of each health care provider liability to $500,000 with any excess of total liability paid from
an Excess Liability Fund); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (2007 & Supp. 2011) (limiting the total
amount recoverable for medical malpractice claims to $2 million in 2011, with established increases
through July 1, 2031 in which the maximum amount recoverable will be $3 million).
119. See H.R. 5 § I l(c)(1) (stating that federal law will not preempt or supersede any state law
specifying a monetary amount for compensatory or punitive damages in a health care suit).
120. See id. § I (c)(1) (allowing states to set their own limits on damages even after the federal law
is enacted).
121. See id. (permitting states to set limits for compensatory and punitive damages); cf OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2315.18 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing that a plaintiff having a substantial physical
deformity or severe permanent physical dysfunction as a result of the injury is not subject to a cap on
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determine the maximum noneconomic damages that an individual may receive
based on his or her remaining life expectancy.123 These are all approaches currently
employed by various states.124
Proposed federal limits on noneconomic and punitive damages in medical
liability claims would serve as the default rule, governing only when state law
would otherwise allow for unlimited damages.125 The federal limit would apply in
states such as Georgia and Illinois, where state legislators enacted limits on
noneconomic damages but activist courts struck them down on state constitutional
grounds.126 The federal noneconomic damage limit would also apply in states that
have not enacted their own limits on damages in medical liability actions.127 In a
few of these states, the state constitution explicitly precludes legislative limits on
damages in personal injury lawsuits,128 which leaves federal reform as the only
option aside from a constitutional amendment.
noneconomic damages, but an action for a non-catastrophic injury cannot be awarded noneconomic
damages exceeding $250,000).
122. H.R. 5 § Il(c). Cf Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 655.017, 893.55 (West 2010) (capping noneconomic
damages at $750,000 in 2006 and allowing the board of governors to submit recommendations for
changing the limit along with reasons for such change).
123. H.R. 5 § Il(c). Cf ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010(b)-(c) (2010) (creating a limit that is either
$1,000,000 or the life expectancy of the plaintiff multiplied by $25,000, whichever is greater).
124. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
125. H.R. 5 §§ 4(a)-(b), 11.
126. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 164 (Ala. 1992) (striking down a
$400,000 cap on noneconomic damages as "an impermissible burden on the right to a trial by jury");
Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 224 (Ga. 2010) (holding that
Georgia's cap on noneconomic damages infringed on the constitutional right to a jury trial); LeBron v.
Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill. 2010) (holding that noneconomic damages cap violated
the separation of powers); Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1236 (N.H. 1991) (striking down an
$875,000 cap since it violated an individual's right to recover damages for his or her injuries); Arneson
v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978) (holding that a North Dakota cap of $300,000 violated
equal protection); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 723 (Wash. 1989) (finding limit on
noneconomic damages to violate an individual's right to a jury trial).
127. Cf H.R. 5 § I I(c)(1) (providing that any state law establishing monetary damages, enacted
before or after proposed federal law, shall not be preempted).
128. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. V, § 32 (prohibiting the legislature from enacting a law which would
limit the amount recovered for injuries resulting in death or injuries to persons or property, outside of
workmen's compensation); PA. CONST. art. Ill, § 18 (prohibiting the legislature from limiting the amount
recovered for injuries resulting in death or a person's property outside of an occupational setting); ARIZ.
CONST. art. 11, § 31 (prohibiting laws that limit the amount of damages recovered for death or injury to
any person); id. art. XVIII, § 6 (providing that the right to recover damages shall not be abrogated or
subject to a statutory limitation); WYo. CONST. art. 10, § 4 (prohibiting limits on the amount of damages
that can be recovered in personal injury suits).
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Ill. FEDERAL ACTION is NEEDED AND APPROPRIATE
A. The Adverse Effects of Excessive Medical Liability Extend Beyond State
Borders
When faced with high medical liability insurance premiums, experience
shows that doctors will curtail their practices to avoid high-risk areas and often
relocate to states with reasonable limits on liability. 129 Congress may appropriately
exercise its authority under the Commerce Clause to safeguard the ability of
doctors to treat patients without costs that are excessive in comparison to
colleagues working in jurisdictions that limit liability.130
B. The Federal Government Has a Large Financial Stake in the Healthcare System
In March 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that
nationwide implementation of medical liability reforms, including caps on
noneconomic damages, would reduce federal budget deficits by $62.4 billion over
ten years.'3 ' These savings would come from a $49.5 billion reduction in costs for
federal programs including Medicare, Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance
Program, the Federal Employees Health Benefits program, and subsidies for
coverage purchased through health insurance exchanges.132 The CBO also found
that because employers would pay less for health insurance for employees, more of
129. See Chiu-Fang Chou & Anthony T. Lo Sasso, Practice Location Choice by New Physicians:
The Importance of Malpractice Premiums, Damage Caps, and Health Professional Shortage Area
Designation, 44 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1271, 1284-85 (2009) (concluding that surgeons are more
likely to move to areas with caps on malpractice damage awards); Kessler et al., supra note 8, at 2623
(finding greater growth in physician supply in states with reforms that directly limit liability); Hellinger
& Encinosa, supra note 6, at 13 (finding that physician supply increased at a faster rate in areas with tort
reform between 1970 and 2000); Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Does Medical Malpractice
Reform Help States Retain Physicians and Does it Matter? 3-5 (November 3, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.usc.edu/schools/business/FBE/seminars/papers/AE 2-17-06
STRATMANN-medmal.pdf (finding that physicians will locate to places where it is cheaper to practice,
including the potential costs of damages from malpractice suits).
130. See COHEN & BURROWS, supra note 27, at 2 (stating that it is within Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause to enact tort reform to safeguard doctors).
131. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS 35-36
(2011), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/120xx/docl2085/03-10-ReducingTheDeficit.pdf (estimated savings
per year from limiting medical malpractice torts which total $62.4 billion). CBO has also provided
various other estimates of cost savings, which may vary based on the methodology and types of reforms
considered. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE, H.R. 5: HELP EFFICIENT, ACCESSIBLE, Low
COST, TIMELY HEALTHCARE (HEALTH) ACT OF 2011 4, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/120xx/
docl2095/hr5.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE] (estimating H.R. 5, as reported by the
House Judiciary Committee on February 16, 2011, would reduce the federal deficit by $40 billion over
the next decade); Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir. Cong. Budget Office to the Honorable Orrin
G. Hatch, Senator (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/doclO641/10-09-Tort_Reform.pdf
(estimating that nationwide implementation of medical liability reforms would reduce federal budget
deficits by $54 billion over ten years).
132. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 131, at 35-36.
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their employees' compensation would be in the form of taxable wages and other
fringe benefits, leading to an additional $12.9 billion in federal revenue over the
next 10 years.'33 Medical liability reform would reduce discretionary spending on
federal programs by about $1.6 billion over the next decade, according to the
CBO.134
In addition to reducing the deficit, the CBO found that medical liability
reform would lead to lower medical liability premiums.' 35 As a result, patients
would benefit from lower prices for healthcare services.136 The CBO also
concluded that reducing the liability pressures on doctors would lead them to
engage in less defensive medicine, saving the cost of expensive, but unnecessary,
services.' 37 Credible estimates of the annual nationwide costs of defensive
medicine conservatively begin at $50 billion.' 38
C. There Is Bipartisan Recognition that Federal Action Is Needed
In December 2010, President Barack Obama's National Commission on
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform discussed many of the reforms included in
recently proposed MICRA-like federal legislation, including modifying the
collateral source rule, imposing a one- to three-year statute of limitations, and
eliminating joint liability.139 The report stated that many of the Commissioners
"believe that we should impose statutory caps on punitive and non-economic
damages, and we recommend that Congress consider this approach and evaluate its
impact." 40 The Commission found that such changes would save taxpayers
$17 billion through 2020.141
13 3. Id.
134. Id. at 36.
135. Id. at 35-36.
136. Id. at 36.
137. See id. (explaining that physicians typically order fewer medical services when they are not
worried about medical malpractice claims).
138. See Michelle M. Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability System, 29 HEALTH AFF.
1569, 1574 (2010) (noting that a 2010 study found that defensive medicine wasted $45.6 billion in
2008). Other studies have reached significantly higher estimates. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS'
HEALTH RESEARCH INST., THE PRICE OF EXCESS: IDENTIFYING WASTE IN HEALTHCARE SPENDING 6
(2008), available at http://www.pwc.com/cz/en/verejna-sprava-zdravotnictvi/prices-of-excess-
healthcare-spending.pdf (estimating the cost of defensive medicine to be $210 billion); Lawrence J.
McQuillan & Hovannes Abramyan, The Facts about Medical Malpractice Liability Costs, HEALTH
POL'Y PRESCRIPTIONS, Oct. 2009, at 1, 2, available at http://www.pacificresearch.org/publications/the-
facts-about-medical-malpractice-liability-costs (estimating costs of $191 billion).
139. See NAT'L COMM'N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, 11ITH CONG., THE MOMENT OF
TRUTH 39-40 (2010), available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/ftiles/
documentsffheMomentofTruthl2_1 2010.pdf.
140. Id. at 40.
141. Id. at 39.
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D. The Benefits ofHealthcare Liability Reform Are Well Documented
There is a sizable body of literature demonstrating that limits on noneconomic
damages can significantly lower medical liability insurance premiums.142 In
California, for instance, medical liability insurance rates have remained relatively
stable while mushrooming in many states that have not enacted reforms.143
Furthermore, "[m]any studies demonstrate that professional liability exposure
has an important effect on recruitment of medical students to the field and retention
of physicians within the field and within a particular state." 44 States with limits on
noneconomic damages generally experience greater increases in the number of
doctors per capita.145 For example, adoption of medical liability reforms, including
a cap on noneconomic damages, in Mississippi restored access to healthcarel 46 in a
state that had the lowest number of physicians per capita in the country and where
many communities did not have a local obstetrician. 147 Likewise, after Texas
enacted a package of reforms that included limits on noneconomic damages,
thousands of physicians came to the state, with many settling in underserved
communities.148 Many of these physicians provide essential specialties, such as
142. See CAROL K. KANE & DAVID W. EMMONS, AM. MED. ASS'N, THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY
PRESSURE AND CAPS ON DAMAGES ON THE HEALTHCARE MARKET: AN UPDATE OF RECENT
LITERATURE 1 (2007); see also Leonard J. Nelson et al., Medical Malpractice Reform in Three Southern
States, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 69, 89 (2008) ("It is clear ... across a number of rigorous studies
using a variety of data periods, measures and methods, damage caps have been shown to be effective in
reducing medical malpractice insurance premiums."); OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING
& EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE
CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL
LIABILITY SYSTEM 15 (2002) [hereinafter CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS], available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.pdf ("[T]here is a substantial difference in the level of medical
malpractice premiums in states with meaningful caps . . . and states without meaningful caps.").
143. See, e.g., Alexis Walters, Medical Liability Reform and the States, BULLETIN OF THE AM. C. OF
SURGEONS, Mar. 2010, at 29, 29 (noting that since 1975, when MICRA was enacted, medical liability
premiums in California have increased approximately less than one-third as much as they have in the
country as a whole).
144. Robert L. Barbieri, Professional Liability Payments in Obstetrics and Gynecology, 107
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 578, 578 (2006).
145. See William E. Encinosa & Fred J. Hellinger, Have State Caps on Malpractice Awards
Increased the Supply ofPhysicians?, 24 HEALTH AFF. W5-250, W5-256 (2005).
146. See Nelson et al., supra note 142, at 139 (finding that, as result of tort reform, by late 2004 "the
problems in [Mississippi] malpractice insurance seem to have abated").
147. See Sarah Domin, Where Have All the Baby-Doctors Gone? Women s Access to Healthcare in
Jeopardy: Obstetrics and the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 499, 501
(2004) (stating that most Mississippi cities with populations of less than 20,000 people no longer had
local obstetricians); Lynne Jeter, Tort Reform Impact Ripples Out Through the Economy, Miss. BUs. J.,
Nov. 29, 2004, at 30, 30 (reporting that in 2002, Mississippi had the lowest number of physicians per
1,000 residents in the country and was losing physicians to other states).
148. See Joseph Nixon, Editorial, Cross Country: Why Doctors Are Heading for Texas, WALL ST.
J., May 17, 2008, at A9 (stating that after Texas enacted tort reform legislation in 2003 and 2005, which
included a $250,000 limit on noneconomic damages, over 7,000 physicians reportedly inundated Texas,
with many going into underserved regions); Rick Perry, Governor of Tex., Speech at the Greater
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obstetrics, orthopedics, and neurosurgery.14 9 In West Virginia, where emergency
rooms lacked trauma surgeons to treat serious bone, brain, and spinal injuries,o50
doctors have seen their average premium decrease by one-third to one-half since
the state adopted reforms.'5 '
In particular, limits on subjective noneconomic damages reduce the pressure
on doctors to engage in defensive medicine, such as ordering costly tests out of
excessive caution because of concern over potential liability.152 In a national
survey, "79% [of physicians] said they had ordered more tests than they would,
based only on professional judgment of what is medically needed, and 91% have
noticed other physicians ordering more tests." 53 A 2005 survey in the Journal of
the American Medical Association found that virtually ninety-three percent of high-
Houston Partnership: Lawsuit Reforms will Expedite Justice for Legitimate Claims and Help Strengthen
Texas' Economic Climate (Mar. 14, 2011), http://govemor.state.tx.us/news/speechl5823/ ("In the first
five years after tort reform passed, more than 14,000 doctors either returned to practice in Texas or
began practicing here for the first time."); see also Barbieri, supra note 144, at 578 (suggesting that the
extremely high medical malpractice and liability payments of obstetrician-gynecologists may deter
medical students from entering the specialty or discourage physicians from continuing to practice within
that specialty).
149. Ralph Blumenthal, After Texas Caps Malpractice Awards, Doctors Rush to Practice There,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2007, at A21.
150. See Phil Kabler, State Doctors Rally for Tort Reform, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug. 20, 2002,
at P2A (reporting that high insurance costs led to the absence of neurosurgeons in Wheeling, Logan, and
Beckley). The lack of trauma surgeons to treat emergency bone, brain, and spinal injuries led West
Virginia's Department of Health and Human Resources ("DHHR") to downgrade the Charleston Area
Medical Center (CAMC) trauma center from a Level I to a Level Ill facility in August 2002. See Dawn
Miller, CAMC Loses Trauma Status: People With Serious Multiple Injuries to go to Morgantown,
Elsewhere, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug. 24, 2002, at PIA (explaining that the new Level Ill status
means those with more than one serious injury will be sent elsewhere for emergency care). Due to the
distance needed to obtain emergency care, West Virginia residents who experience serious injuries
stemming from car accidents to gunshots could die or become paralyzed because of the distance
necessary to travel to a trauma hospital, when they might have been otherwise saved. See Joy Davia,
Trauma Patients Forced to Make Longer Trips to Get Care, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 11, 2002, at
P1C.
151. See W.VA. OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM'R, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT: INSURERS WITH
5% MARKET SHARE 51 (2009), http://wvinsurance.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-KHt9sy2Fod4%3d&
tabid=207&mid=798 (showing that the average premium per physician dropped from $40,034.93 in
2004 to $21,026.19 in 2008). Physicians insured with the state's largest medical liability insurer, West
Virginia Mutual Insurance Company, have experienced an overall average decrease in premiums of 32%
with many specialists receiving as much as a 55% reduction since 2004. W.VA. MUT. INS. Co., ANNUAL
REPORT 2 (2009), http://www.wvmic.com/docs/2009 WV Mutual Annual Report.pdf. Thus, premiums
are down one-third to one-half compared to 2004, depending on the area of practice. Id. at 4-5. In 2010,
West Virginia Mutual provided a 12% dividend credit to all renewing doctors as additional premium
relief. Unprecedented Rate Relief Continues, Q. COVERAGE (W.Va. Mut. Ins. Co., Charleston, W.Va.),
Summer 2010, at 3, available at http://www.wvmic.com/docs/Summer/202010%2ONewsletter.pdf.
The insurer directly attributes its ability to provide rate relief for policyholders to tort reform legislation.
Id. at 1.
152. See Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, Ill
QUARTERLY J. OF ECON. 353, 383 (1996) (finding that tort reforms can reduce health care costs by five
percent to nine percent without substantial effects on mortality or medical complications).
153. CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS, supra note 142, at 4.
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risk specialists in Pennsylvania ordered unnecessary tests, performed unwarranted
diagnostic procedures, and referred patients for unneeded consultations to protect
themselves from litigation.154 In a 2008 survey, eighty-three percent of
Massachusetts physicians reported practicing defensive medicine; the survey also
concluded that about twenty-five percent of all radiological imaging tests were
ordered for defensive purposes, and twenty-eight percent and thirty-eight percent,
respectively, of those surveyed admitted reducing the number of high-risk patients
they saw and limiting the number of high-risk procedures or services they
performed. 55 In Mississippi, from 1998 to 2002, the counties with the most
litigation had higher per capita medical expenditures as a result of defensive
practices. 156
The costs of defensive medicine are "passed almost entirely to the consumer,"
if not directly, then indirectly through private or public insurance plans. '
"[M]alpractice reforms that directly reduce provider liability pressure lead to
reductions of 5 to 9 percent in medical expenditures without substantial effects on
mortality or medical complications." 5 1
Limits on noneconomic damages may also reduce another form of defensive
medicine-i.e., the avoidance of higher risk patients. In Mississippi, "[p]rior to tort
reform, many physicians had ceased practicing in the state or discontinued high-
risk procedures due to a largely unregulated legal climate in which multimillion-
dollar lawsuit rewards had driven malpractice insurance rates up to unaffordable
levels."' 59 As further explained by a blue-ribbon panel in Florida: "The concern
over litigation and the cost and lack of medical malpractice insurance have caused
doctors to discontinue high-risk procedures, turn away high-risk patients, close
practices, and move out of the state. In some communities, doctors have ceased or
154. David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a
Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2609 (2005).
155. Press Release, Mass, Med. Soc'y, MMS First-of-its-kind Survey of Physicians Shows Extent
and Cost of the Practice of Defensive Medicine and its Multiple Effects of Health Care on the State
(Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://www.massmed.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Advocacy
andPolicy&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=23559.
156. See Brandon Roberts & Irving Hoch, Malpractice Litigation and Medical Costs in Mississippi,
16 HEALTH EcoN. 841, 851-52 (2007) (concluding that increased litigation correlates with increased
Medicare expenditures for several potential reasons, including the practice of defensive medicine).
157. Brandon Roberts, Research Explores Effects of Malpractice Litigation on Medical Costs, Miss.
BUS. J., June 25, 2007, at B19.
158. Palmisano, supra note 1, at 377 (quoting Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, Do Doctors
Practice Defensive Medicine? 2 (Nat'l Bur. Of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5466, 1996),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w5466.pdf); see also Nelson et al., supra note 142, at 90
(discussing studies which "have found a link between the adoption of malpractice reforms and the
reduction in defensive medical practices.").
159. Advocate, MD Takes Advantage of the Success of Tort Reform, Purchases Mississippi Medical
Malpractice Availability Plan, HEALTH & MED. WK., June 9, 2008, at 2975.
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discontinued delivering babies and discontinued hospital care." 60 Noneconomic
damages limits also promote more uniform treatment of individuals with
comparable injuries,' 6 1 facilitate settlements, and address potential due process
problems with excessive awards.162
CONCLUSION
More than a century of United States Supreme Court precedent,163 the
consistent rejection of federal constitutional challenges to state medical liability
reform,'1 and the Congressional Research Service's expert opinion 65 prove that
MICRA-like federal medical liability reform legislation would pass constitutional
muster if challenged. A MICRA-like federal medical liability reform law including
a nationwide limit on noneconomic damages would help all Americans obtain
access to more affordable healthcare.' 66 Furthermore, by retaining significant
flexibility for states to enact their own medical liability laws, the legislation
respects states' rights and federalism principles.167
160. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 353-54 (quoting FLA. DEPT. OF HEALTH, GOVERNOR'S SELECT
TASK FORCE ON HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE vi (2003)); see also Jonathan
Thomas, The Effect of Medical Malpractice, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 306, 312
(2010); Laura A. Bischoff, Taft Signs Malpractice Reform Bill: Cap on Awards for Pain and Suffering,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 11, 2003, at BI (reporting that before Ohio limited medical liability
noneconomic damages, premium increases led "some doctors to retire early, move, or turn away high-
risk patients").
161. See Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 763, 769 (1995) (unpredictability "undermines the legal system's claim that like cases will be
treated alike").
162. See Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391, 400 n.22 (Mich. 2004) ("A grossly
excessive award for pain and suffering may violate the Due Process Clause even if it is not labeled
'punitive."').
163. See supra Part 1.
164. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
165. COHEN & BURROWS, supra note 27, at 2 (finding that Congress has power, under the
Commerce Clause, to regulate medical malpractice).
166. See Ronen Avraham, An Empirical Study of the Impact of Tort Reforms on Medical
Malpractice Settlement Payments, 36 J. LEGAL STUDIES Sl83, S221 (2007) (discussing a study of more
than 100,000 settled cases that showed that caps on noneconomic damages "do in fact have an impact on
settlement payments"); Nelson et al., supra note 142, at 89 (concluding that tort damages caps
effectively lead to reduced medical malpractice insurance rates); Meredith L. Kilgore et al., Tort Law
and Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 43 INQUIRY 255, 265 (2006) (damage limits lowered
premiums for internal medicine, general surgery, and obstetrics/gynecology by 17.3%, 20.7%, and
25.5%, respectively).
167. See supra Part 11.
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